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Abstract: Many welfare-to-work programs in both North America and Europe are 
directed at making work pay for the low skilled. This paper identifies two alternative 
policies that are motivated by this same objective – active labour market programs that 
involve wage subsidies together with improved job matching; and earned income tax 
credits that supplement wages for working low-income families. Although sharing 
similar concerns over labour market incentives for low skilled workers, these alternative 
policies typically differ in many important ways. We present an evaluation of the 
impacts of two such recent programs designed to enhance the labour market attachment 
of low-wage workers in the UK. These programs have many features in common and 
are similar to many policy proposals in Europe and North America. The evaluation of 
the UK reforms brings empirical evidence into the debate on the effectiveness of these 
programs and is used to assess what aspects of their design work well and what aspects 
could be improved.  
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This paper reviews the effectiveness of two alternative approaches to enhancing 
labour market attachment and earnings among the low skilled  – tax credit/in-work 
benefit programs and wage subsidy/job search programs. Although the former is often 
classed as a welfare policy and the latter as an active labour market policy, both are 
motivated by similar concerns and share many similar design features. By placing one 
alongside the other we can examine the appropriateness of the design of each and assess 
where improvements could be made. Although we are interested in the design of such 
programs our analysis is largely empirical. To evaluate each of these policies we draw 
on the recent experience of policy reforms in the UK. 
The UK in the 1990s is, in many ways, an ideal test bed for such policies since both 
were introduced and enhanced over this period. These polices were targeted at two 
groups: (1) low income/low educated families with young children, (2) low skilled 
workers with repeat unemployment spells. In both cases the diagnosis is similar: 
relatively low hourly wages among the low skilled with little labour market experience 
provide little incentive for work.
1 However, the detail is different. In the first case it is 
the generosity of the out of work benefit system for families relative to potential 
earnings and child-care costs that are though to provide the disincentive. For the second 
group it is the employer matching and the low initial wages that are perceived as the 
central issue. Consequently, although the objective for both is to enhance net earnings in 
work, the first involves a long-term income related supplement to earnings, possibly 
with a childcare component. While the second centers on job search assistance and short 
term wage subsidies. But are these differences in the design appropriate and could they 
be improved?  
The ‘in-work’ structure of these two approaches is similar relying on earnings 
credits or wage subsidies. But again they typically work rather differently. The wage 
subsidy is individually based, not means-tested and of limited duration. Eligibility is 
also typically UI (or welfare) duration dependent. The earned income tax credit is 
typically family income based, means-tested against family income and without a time 
                                                 
1 There are now similar policies directed toward those on disability insurance (New Deal for Disabled 
People) and early exit from the labour market of low wage older workers. However, it is too early to 
assess these programs.   3
limit. For the later, the WFTC in the UK, the EITC in the US
2 and the In-Work Tax 
Credit in Belgium
3 are prime examples. For the f ormer, the New Deal in the UK is a 
leading example. There are, of course, labour market policies that fall somewhere in 
between. The Self-Sufficiency Project in Canada
4, for example, is a time-limited earned 
income tax credit directed toward low-income families for which eligibility depends on 
overall family income, family composition, a minimum welfare duration and a 
minimum hours requirement. There was also job search assistance for those in the 
Canadian program.  
So what is the best design for such policies? Does time limiting help with human 
capital and wage progression? If so, how long? Should family income means-testing be 
used to target incentives to those on low incomes?  If so, at what level should the credit 
withdrawal rate be set?  Should the wage subsidy or tax credit be tied to a specific 
employer? Should there be a minimum hours requirement? 
To set the scene for our analysis we turn first to the labour market trends over the 
last two decades that have motivated these reforms. We highlight the cyclical volatility 
for employment for certain target groups and the secular changes in employment 
patterns for others. Again we focus on the UK experience. In the following section we 
then consider the particular design features of these programs. In section 3 we move on 
to evaluate specific aspects of these reforms, focusing on the shorter run employment 
effects. We conclude, in section 4, with a brief assessment of their effectiveness in 
achieving overall labour market objectives. 
1  The Changing Structure and Economic Environment of Low Wage 
Workers 
This section considers the labour market trends that stimulated the two welfare- 
to-work reforms in the UK that are the focus of our discussion. We turn first to the 
labour market for the young unskilled that motivated the New Deal program.
5 We 
                                                 
2 See Eissa and Liebman (1996). 
3 See Gradus and Jusling (2001), who also review similar schemes and proposals in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Finland. 
4 See Card and Robins (1998). 
5 See DfEE (1997).   4
highlight the cyclical volatility of unemployment for this group and the frequency of 
short run transitions. We then move on to the corresponding employment trends for 
low-income families, which motivated the WFTC reform.  Here non-employment rather 
than unemployment is a more relevant measure of activity and we highlight the 
importance of both cyclical and secular trends.  
1.1 The Labour Market Background for the New Deal Reform 
In many respects the UK pattern of unemployment is similar to other European 
countries. Figure 1 displays the total unemployed claimant count since 1960 and Figure 
2 shows the standard ILO unemployment rates from 1978 onwards.  There has been a 
steady upward drift of unemployment since 1960, with a very large increase post 1979. 
Until the 1990s, the trough of each recession was associated with higher unemployment 
than the previous downturn. The current expansion has pushed the number of 
unemployed below that of the previous cycle.  Another feature of UK unemployment is 
its volatility. The UK has experienced sharp boom-bust cycles. There were deep 
recessions in the early 1980s and early 1990s and a fast boom in the mid-late 1980s. 
There was a similar boom in the late 1990s/early 2000s. 
By the end of the  1990s UK unemployment was relatively low by OECD 
standards. This has been a relatively recent phenomenon, however. Over the 1983-96 
period UK unemployment rates have been above the OECD average, certainly higher 
than Germany's (which has never fully recovered from the shock of re-unification in 
1989) although lower than France's
6. Over 1973-1984 UK unemployment was worse 
than the OECD average. In terms of its long-term unemployment rates, the UK appears 
much closer to a European country than to the US.
7 
Across all countries youth unemployment is higher than unemployment for 
prime age individuals. There is a relatively high proportion of young Britons in jobs and 
a low proportion of young people in school. There is also a large proportion of British 
youth that are neither in school nor in the labour force. The UK has the highest numbers  
                                                 
6 Between 1983-96 OECD average unemployment was 8.2%, 9.7% in the UK 6.2% in West Germany and 
10.4% in France (Nickell, 1997).  
7 See Van Reenen (2001) for further details.   5






































































Source: Labour Market Trends and Employment Gazette, various issues 
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Figure 3: Claimant unemployment amongst 18-24 year olds
 
 
Source: Labour Market Trends and Employment Gazette, various issues 
 
of 18-year-old men in this category and is second (after Italy) for 22-year-old men
8. 
Moreover, the UK has had the largest increase in the proportion of this group of youth 
since 1984. Another feature of the youth labour market is its sensitivity to the business 
cycle. The unemployment rates of the younger group, displayed in Figure 3, broadly 
mirror the overall picture, but are more cyclically sensitive. This is also true for the 
employment rates (see Bell, Blundell and Van Reenen, 1999) 
1.2 The Labour Market Background for the WFTC Reform 
The levels of non-employment among certain specific groups have also been the 
motivation for earned income tax credit reforms  – or in-work benefit reforms. For 
example, one central motivation for the introduction and subsequent expansion of the 
Working Families Tax Credit in the UK was the persistence in the low levels of 
attachment to the labour market by single mothers - at a time when for other groups of 
similar women attachment has generally been increasing. Figure 4 shows the secular 
change in female employment across four household types in the UK.  The growth in 
the attachment by married women with children is as noticeable as is the fall for single    7
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Notes: FES Data, working age. 
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Notes: FES Data, head of working age. 
                                                                                                                                               
8 The proportion idle was 8.4% in the UK in 1997 compared to 2.3% in 1984. In 1997 the OECD average 
was 1.8%, with 5.6% in the US, 4.2% in Germany, 3.3% in France and 9.1% in Italy (see Blanchflower 
and Freeman, 2000)).   8
women with children.
9 This is even more pronounced for those who left school at age 
16 or before (age 16 being the minimum school leaving age for those born after 1960).  
Not only has attachment of lone mothers fallen but, at the same time, the size of this 
group has risen by more that twofold over the last twenty years.  
Another distinguishing feature of the UK has been the growth in workless 
couples with children. This is documented in Figure 5 and provided a strong argument 
in the debate for the WFTC. Indeed, for married women with unemployed husbands 
employment rates have stayed no higher than 30% over the past two decades – even 
lower than employment rates for the single parent group (see Blundell (2001a)). The 
(non-) employment rates for these two groups show clearly why they have been singled 
out as two target groups for tax and benefit reform. 
But it is not just the low employment rates that have attracted attention. So have 
the low real wages for the low skilled and the relatively low growth in these wages over 
the past two decades. Indeed, there have been remarkable shifts in returns to education 
and skill in many countries (see Gosling et. al. (2000) for the UK and Katz and Autor 
(1999) for a cross country survey).  For example, in the U.S. real earnings for the lowest 
education groups have fallen yearly since the late 1970s. This characteristic is quite 
exaggerated in the U.S., but it is nonetheless common to most developed countries.  
It is these simple labour market facts that focussed policy attention in the UK on 
“in-work” benefits and wage subsidies for the low-skilled.  The aim being to make work 
more attractive for those whose current labour market opportunities are not sufficient to 
induce work. 
2  The New Deal and WFTC Reforms in Context 
2.1  The Design of the New Deal  
The New Deal for Young People in the UK is targeted at the 18 to 24 years old with 
at least six months unemployment. Participation is compulsory, so that every eligible 
individual who refuses to participate risks loosing their entitlement to benefits. The 
criteria for eligibility are simple: every individual aged between 18 and 24 by the time 
                                                 
9 These figures are drawn from the repeated cross-sections of the British Family Expenditure Survey. As 
such they refer to different people over time and will therefore exhibit systematic composition changes   9
of completion of the sixth month on Job Seekers' Allowance (JSA) – the standard flat 
rate Unemployment Insurance in the UK  - is assigned to  the program and starts 
receiving treatment. Given the stated rules, the program can be classified as one of 
“global implementation”, being administered to everyone in the UK meeting the 
eligibility criteria. Indirect effects that spill over to other groups than the treatment 
group may occur. The nature of these effects will be discussed below. 
The path of a participant through the New Deal is composed of three main steps 
(see Figure 6). On assignment to the program, the individual starts the first stage of the 
treatment called the Gateway. This is the part of the program being evaluated in the 
present study. It lasts for up to 4 months and is composed of intensive job-search 
assistance and small basic skills' courses. Each individual is assigned a “Personal 
advisor”, a mentor who they meet at least once every two weeks to encourage/enforce 
job search. 
The second stage is composed of four possible options. First, there is the employer 
option - a six-month spell on a subsidized employment. For the subsidized employment 
                                                                                                                                               
according to birth cohort, education and other factors. Blundell and Hoynes (2001) provide further 
discussion and also a direct comparison with similar trends in the US. 
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option, the employer receives a £60 a week wage subsidy during the first six months of 
employment plus an additional £750 payment for a required minimum amount of job 
training equivalent to one day a week
10. Second, an individual can enroll in a stipulated 
full-time education or training course and receive an equivalent amount to the JSA 
payment for up to twelve months (and may be eligible for special grants in order to 
cover exceptional expenses). Third, individuals can work in the voluntary sector for up 
to six months (paid a wage or allowance at least equal to JSA plus £400 spread over the 
six months). Finally, they may take a job on the Environmental Task Force (essentially 
government jobs) and be paid a wage or allowance at least equal to JSA plus £400 
(spread over the six months).
11 
The program was launched in the whole UK in April 1998. There was, however, a 
previous Pilot three months’ period, from January to March 1998, when the program 
was implemented in 12 areas, called the Pathfinder Pilots (see Anderson, Riley and 
Young, 1999). Clearly, identification of the treatment effect under these conditions 
requires stronger assumptions than when an experiment is run within regions using 
random assignment. The problem relates with the fact that the  counterfactual must 
either be drawn from a different labor market or from a group with different 
characteristics operating in the same labor market. These evaluation issues are discussed 
in detail in Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2001), below we simply 
summarise the results of that evaluation study. 
2.2   The Design of the WFTC 
In-work benefits have existed in the UK in various forms since the 1970s. 
However, the current Working Families Tax Credit has its antecedents in the Family 
Credit system introduced in the late 1980s. This was designed to provide support for 
low wage working families. In this system each eligible family was paid a credit up to a 
maximum amount which depended on the number of children. There was also a small 
                                                 
10 This is quite generous. The mean starting wage for those on a subsidized job is £3.78 an hour, implying 
a 40 per cent level of subsidy for a 37 hour week. 
11  Once the option period is over, if the individual has not managed to keep/find a job or leave the 
claimant count for any other reason, the third stage of the program is initiated, the Follow Through. This 
is a process similar to the Gateway, taking up to 13 weeks, where job-search assistance is the main 
treatment being provided (see Van Reenen (2001)).   11
addition if in full time work. Eligibility depended on family net income being lower 
than some threshold (£79.00 per week in 1998-99). As incomes rose the credit was 
withdrawn at a rate of 70%. In 1996 average payments were around £57 a week and 
take-up rates stand at 69% of eligible individuals and 82% of the potential expenditure. 
An unusual feature of the Family Credit system, retained in the WFTC reform, is a 
minimum weekly hours eligibility criterion. A family with children required one adult 
working 16 hours or more per week to qualify. At its introduction in 1988 this hours cut 
off was set at 24 hours but then reduced in 1992 to encourage part-time work by lone 
parents with young children (see Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (1999)).   













2 children 1 child
 Source: Brewer (2001) 
The WFTC reform increased the generosity of in-work support relative to the FC 
system in four ways: It increased the credit for younger children. It increased the 
threshold. It reduced the benefit reduction rate from 70% to 55%. Finally, it 
incorporated a childcare credit of 70% of actual childcare costs up to £150 per week (for  
   12
Figure 8: Single Mother before WFTC 
Notes: Single parent, April 1997, earning £3.50 per hour (2000 prices). 
Figure 9: Single Mother after WFTC 
Notes: Single parent, April 2000, earning £3.50 per hour (2000 prices). 
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two children, £100 for one child). The largest cash gains went to those people were 
currently just at the end of the benefit reduction taper. The childcare credit increased the 
maximum amount of WFTC by 70% of childcare costs up to a maximum of £100 per 
week for those with one child or £150 per week for those with two or more children. 
The credit was available to lone parents and couples where both partners w ork more 
than 16 hours per week. The transfers underlying the WFTC are illustrated in Figure 7. 
The impact of the WFTC reform relative to existing Family Credit is shown in 
the budget constraint for a ‘typical’ single parent presented in Figures 8 and 9. These 
highlight the similarity of the FC and WFTC systems and also the importance of 
interactions between the in-work tax credit system and other means tested benefits. In 
particular income support and housing benefit seriously reduce the underlying incentive 
in the system (see Blundell, 2001a, for further discussion). Nonetheless, a look at the 
histogram of weekly hours worked for single parents presented in Figure 10 shows a 
strong peak in hours worked at 16 hours. This is not evident for ineligible groups such 
as single childless working women. 
Figure 10: Weekly Hours Worked: Low Education Single Parents in the UK  














3  Evaluating the Labour Market Impact of the Reforms 
3.1 The New Deal Program 
Given that this program has not been running for a long period, we focus here on an 
evaluation of the Gateway. In particular, we are concerned with the degree to which 
enhanced job assistance has lead to more outflows to jobs. The evaluation is based on 
data provided by the Pathfinder areas before the National Roll Out of the program, as 
well as on data available following the National Roll Out. There are two main issues 
that need to be considered in evaluating the impact of the program: the precise nature of 
the comparison group, and hence the definition of what is being measured, and the set 
of assumptions that underlie the interpretation of the parameter we estimate in each 
case. The clear understanding of these issues is an important input in an eventual cost-
benefit analysis of the program since they determine the outcome from the program. 
There are some important aspects covered within this discussion.
12 One of them 
concerns the extent to which we can estimate the overall impact of the program on 
employment as opposed to the impact on the eligible individuals. Potential differences 
in the two outcomes may result from two main factors. First, the impact of the program 
on eligible individuals may be at the expense of worsened labor market opportunities 
for similar but ineligible individuals. Second, the wider implementation of the program 
and the opportunities it offers to participants may affect the equilibrium level of wages 
and employment, affecting all workers. 
We focus on the impact of the program on the proportion leaving unemployment 
within four months of entering the “Gateway”  – see Figure 6 above. The choice is 
mainly dictated by the desire to focus on the stated government targets and the paucity 
of data on individuals after they have finished the options.
13 We pay special attention to 
the outflows into employment, but we also examine total outflows from unemployment 
to all destinations.
14 
                                                 
12 See Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999) and references therein. 
13 Our data currently ends in July 1999. Individuals entering the Gateway in April 1998 and joining the 
year-long education and training option after four months will only start job search in August 1999. 
14 Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2001) assess the importance of the estimated effects 
and interpret them in an historical perspective. They provide some l ower and upper bounds for the   15
Our approach to estimate the impact of the New Deal program relies on using 
information from the pilot period as well as information from the National Roll out. The 
New Deal can affect employment of both eligible and ineligible individuals in a number 
of ways. First the eligible individuals receive job search assistance, which may enhance 
their ability to find a job. Second, some of the individuals in the Gateway program 
receive wage subsidies, reducing the cost of employing them for an initial period of six 
months. This wage subsidy will expand the employment of such workers but may also 
lead to a substitution of other workers for these cheaper ones, if labour markets are not 
competitive. However, under competition the worker would retain all the subsidy except 
for any shortfall of his/her productivity relative to pay. The extent to which this may 
happen will depend on a number of factors. If the subsidy just covers the deficit in 
productivity and the reservation wage of the workers as well as the costs of training, we 
would not expect any substitution; these workers are no cheaper than anyone else. 
Second, it will depend on the extent that these workers are substitutable in production 
for existing workers and on the extent that it is easy to churn workers. The latter is an 
important point, since the subsidy only lasts six months. Moreover the agencies 
implementing the New Deal are supposed to be monitoring the behavior of firms using 
wage subsidies and employing individuals on the New Deal. Of course if job durations 
are generally short, firms will be able to use subsidized workers instead of the non-
subsidized ones, without any extra effort.  
An additional effect of the New Deal may be to decrease wage pressure through the 
increase in labor supply and through the presence of wage subsidies. This will tend to 
increase employment for all types of workers and will counteract the effects of 
substitution on the non-treatment group. 
Assessing the importance of substitution and of general equilibrium effects through 
wages or other channels is of central importance. Using the comparison between the 
pilot and control areas as described below, and assuming these areas are sufficiently 
separate labor markets from each other, we will be able to assess the extent to which 
                                                                                                                                               
treatment effect by using other pre-program time periods. This can be done for total outflow for all years 
since 1982.   16
substitution and other General Equilibrium effects combined are likely to be important 
“side-effects” of the program, at least in the short run.
15 
The available options for the choice of the comparison group depend on the type of 
evaluation being performed. When assessing the program from data on its National Roll 
Out, we are constrained to use ineligible individuals within the same area, for which we 
have chosen the age rule to define (in)eligibility. For the Pilot Study, however, the 
regional rule provides an additional instrument in the definition of the comparison 
group. We have used it in two ways, constructing two possible comparison groups: The 
first takes all eligible individuals living in all non-Pathfinder areas; The second selects 
all eligible individuals in the set of non-Pathfinder areas that most closely resemble the 
Pathfinder areas in a way detailed below. The goal of a careful choice of the comparison 
group is to satisfy a central assumption in non-experimental evaluation, which requires 
that the time trend evolve in the same way for treatments and controls.
16  
The aim of matching the areas is to achieve a match as close as possible w ith 
respect to labor market characteristics. The procedure followed to match on labor 
market characteristics makes use of a quarterly time-series of the outcome variable from 
1982 to just before the introduction of the New Deal, in January 1998. A measure of 
distance was then computed for each possible pair of Pathfinder and non-Pathfinder 
areas and the two nearest neighbors were chosen. Once the two nearest neighboring 
areas have been chosen based on similarity of the labor market trends, we carry out our 
estimation (see Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2001) for details of 
these procedures). 
The Results from the New Deal Pilot Areas 
To evaluate the impact of the New Deal we have considered a number of 
different possible comparison groups, providing some insight on the possible size of 
indirect effects. These comparison groups have been constructed either using older and 
hence ineligible individuals (25-30 mostly) in the pilot areas or individuals of the same 
age residing in the non-pilot areas. In addition we have controlled for labor market 
                                                 
15 See Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998). 
16 See Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000), for example.   17
history variables, age (when similar age groups are being compared), marital status, 
region and sought occupation.  
The results, reported in Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2001),  
indicate that after 4 months of treatment, the Gateway improved participants' exits into 
employment very significantly – all the estimators point to an impact of about 10-11 
percentage points, with a standard error of 4-5 percentage points This effect is even 
more impressive if compared with the outflow rates of about 24 per cent of individuals 
in the treatment group over the similar four months period. However, this result is best 
placed in context when contrasted with the information from the New Deal Evaluation 
Database (NDED) concerning outflows into the subsidized employment option. It is 
estimated that the outflows into an employment option after 4 months of treatment sum 
up to 5.7 per cent of men joining the Gateway. Hence, what was supposed to be a period 
of pure job search assistance and counseling, in practice also involved offering wage 
subsidies to certain individuals. Subtracting this off the overall New Deal effect would 
give a “pure” Gateway impact (on outflows to unsubsidized employment) of about 4 per 
cent. This is likely to be a lower bound. The calculation assumes that there is essentially 
no deadweight of the employer subsidy and that the employment subsidy was targeted 
to the individuals who would not benefit from the job search assistance. If, on the other 
extreme, it is believed that the subsidized jobs are being allocated to the most 
employable participants (and hence those who would have benefited from the job search 
assistance), then the amount of scaling down required might be small. Furthermore, the 
NDED will tend to find larger job outflows because of fewer missing values. Thus 4 per 
cent is a lower bound for the pure Gateway/job assistance effect. The method used to 
estimate the impact of treatment does not seem to substantially influence the results, 
reflecting some robustness of the estimates to the functional form assumptions.
17  
Finally the results obtained are very similar across different plausible comparison 
groups. However, these results should differ substantially if substitution of eligible for 
ineligible workers was a major factor. For example the results of comparing the 19-24 
year olds to the 25-30 year olds within a pilot area would have been much larger than 
those obtained by comparing the 19-24 year olds in pilot and control areas. This did not 
happen, which we interpret to imply little or no substitution at the beginning of the   18
programme. Of course substitution may well occur later. Moreover, substitution may 
have been masked by the effects of pressure on wages which could boost employment 
for both groups – although this is probably unlikely in such a short period  of time when 
the programme was piloted in a limited set of areas. 
Thus all results confirm that, during the Pilot period, the program had a significant 
positive impact on outflows to employment on the markets it has been implemented.  
Results from the New Deal National Roll Out 
Results from the National Roll Out show an implied effect of around 5.3 per 
cent on a pre-program base outflow of 25.8 per cent, and once more, the method used 
does not seem the affect the result significantly. Although this is still a substantial 
impact, it is about half the magnitude estimated for the Pilot period and should be 
compared to an outflow to the subsidized employment option of 3.9%. These 
differences in size can be accounted for by a “program introduction” effect. In the first 
few months the program is operating, a very large increase in the flows to employment 
is observed, which then falls as the program matures. 
Summary 
In summary, the New Deal is a mandatory active labour market program affecting 
all young people claiming unemployment benefit for at least six months in the UK. The 
program offers a combination of treatments, particularly job assistance for four months 
and a wage subsidy paid to employers. The gateway period has been shown to have had 
some modest positive impacts, particularly if we are willing to believe that the outflows 
to the subsidised employment option should not be counted against the effects of the 
programme. In understanding the programme and comparing it other US programmes 
one should note some of its crucial properties: First, the program is mandatory. Refusal 
to participate results in sanctions. Mandatory, sanction-enforced schemes have often 
been found to be more effective than voluntary schemes. Secondly, the "disadvantaged 
youths" we consider are less disadvantaged than those treated in typical US programs 
(e.g. ex-offenders). To the extent that programs are more effective on those who are 
                                                                                                                                               
17 For robustness checks and the details of the evaluation methodology see Blundell et. al. (2001).   19
more job ready, one would expect to see more signs of a program effect in the UK than 
in the US. 
3.2  The WFTC Reform 
To examine the WFTC reform we adopt an ex-ante simulation model developed 
in Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (1999).
18 This is simply because the available 
household level data (the Family Resources Survey) is pre-reform. Some post-reform 
administrative figures are now available and we double check our predictions against 
these. The model appears to work well and the simulations point to many of the 
important aspects of designing and implementing an in-work credit program of this 
type. 
The simulations focus on the two target groups for the WFTC reform: single 
parents and married couples with children using two samples from the British Family 
Resources Surveys (FRS). Nearly 50% of currently working single parents were found 
to be in receipt of some Family Credit. For married couples with children this 
proportion is smaller, at around 16%.  However, the latter group is more than two and 
half times the size of the former.  
 
Table 1: WFTC Reform Simulations 
Group  Number  % 
Single Parents  34,000  2.20 
Married Women (Partner 
not working) 
11,000  1.32 
Married Women (Partner 
working) 
-20,000  -0.57 
Married men, partner 
not working 
13,000  0.37 
Married men, partner 
working 
-10,500  0.30 
Total Effect  27,500   
Decrease in Workerless 
Families 
57,000   
Source:  Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (2000) 
 
                                                 
18 This work develops earlier structural labour supply simulation models by Hoynes (1996), for example.  
In particular, it allows for child care demands to vary with hours worked and it allows for fixed costs of 
work. It also accounts for take-up by incorporating welfare stigma following on from Keane and Moffitt 
(1998).    20
As we have seen, the WFTC reform is designed to influence the work incentives 
of those families with low potential returns in the labour market. It does this via the 
increased generosity of in-work means-tested benefits. For single parents the WFTC 
does unambiguously increase the incentive to work. For couples, however, income 
effects from a working spouse created by the WFTC, can lead to a lower participation in 
the labour market. Table 1 presents an overall impact of the reform. 
 One can clearly see the reason for these shifts in participation from the earlier 
graphs of the potential impact of the WFTC on single parents' budget constraints. At or 
above 16 hours per week the single parent becomes eligible for WFTC (with any 
childcare credit addition to which she may be entitled). For some women this extra 
income makes a transition to part-time employment attractive. Nevertheless, the level of 
the aggregate behavioural response for single parents is perhaps lower than one might 
have anticipated given the potential cost of the WFTC reform.
19  
For married women the simulated incentive effect is quite different. There is a 
significant overall  reduction in the number of women in work. The predominant 
negative response is clearly not one that is intended, but from the earlier budget 
constraint analysis one can easily see why. There will be a proportion of non-working 
women whose low earning  partners will be eligible for the WFTC. The greater 
generosity of the tax credit relative to the current system of Family Credit increases 
household income. This increase in income would be lost if the woman in the household 
were to work. And for those women currently in the labour market, the WFTC increases 
the income available to the household if she were to stop working. 
For the sub-sample of women whose partners do not work there is an overall 
increase in participation. The reason for this is more straightforward, and stems from the 
increased generosity of the basic WFTC relative to the current Family Credit system for 
those women who choose to move into work. Note that for this group the generosity of 
the childcare credit component of the WFTC is not an issue, since households only 
qualify for the childcare credit if both household members work 16 hours or more. 
                                                 
19 Blundell (2001a) reports a minor offsetting reduction in labour supply through a simulated shift from 
full-time to part-time employment among 0.2% of the sample. This is consistent with a small (negative) 
income effect among some full-time single women, for whom the increase in income through the WFTC   21
There is of course potential for both members of an unemployed household to move 
into work in order to qualify for the WFTC including the childcare credit, but a joint 
simulation (not reported here) shows that such an outcome is virtually non-existent.   
Some Recent Ex-Post Evidence 
The WFTC was introduced for all new recipients in October 1999 and fully 
phased in by April 2000. From recent administrative caseload data
20, the introduction of 
the WFTC, and the substantial increase in generosity, appears to have had a marked 
effect on the number of people claiming in-work benefits. Indeed the caseload has risen 
by 30% in the 12 months since May 1999.
21 
Obviously some of the change in WFTC caseload is due to the increased numbers 
of already working parents who qualify for WFTC due to its increased generosity. This 
alone cannot be taken as a measure of success in increasing employment. We can learn 
a little more by looking at administrative data on cross-benefit flows. Brewer (2001) 
breaks down the WFTC/FC caseload by their situation 12 months ago. This analysis 
shows that a large component of the caseload increase (around 75%, taking the last 4 
quarters of FC as a baseline) since October 1999 has come from people who were not 
claiming any means-tested benefits or tax credits 12 months before. Both these two 
facts are consistent with the increased entitlement of the WFTC compared with FC. 
Taken together with our simulation results these administrative statistics suggest 
that the impact of the WFTC reform on employment among low-income families in the 
UK has been positive but modest. This supports our overall view that the workings of 
the tax and benefit system in the UK together with the increased generosity to workless 
families with children, mean that changes to financial work incentives from in-work 
benefit reforms are relatively small.
22 
                                                                                                                                               
encourages a reduction in labour supply.  Nevertheless, the predominant incentive effect among single 
parents could be said do be small but positive. 
20 Department of Social Security, Client Group Analysis. 
21 There has also been a large increase in take-up of the Childcare Tax Credit compared to the childcare 
disregard under Family Credit. 111,000 families were receiving help with childcare costs in May 2000, a 
156% increase over 12 months. The average amount of costs claimed was £32 a week. But although a 
large increase, this is still only 10% of the total WFTC caseload 
22 One caveat to this is the possible impact of childcare credit. Under WFTC this is a generous scheme 
available only to those in work (requiring both parents in a couples to work at least 16 hours) but, as we 
have indicated, it is currently taken up by only a small fraction of WFTC recipients. If participation in this   22
4  Concluding Assessment 
In this paper we have identified two alternative types of labour market interventions 
that both attempt to enhance the labour market attachment and earnings of low skilled 
and low experienced workers. The first is an individually based active labour market 
program (ALMP) that assists in job search and provides the chance of a wage subsidy 
once employment is found. Eligibility typically depends on a minimum duration on 
unemployment insurance or welfare, the subsidy is typically individually based and 
time limited. The second type of labour market policy  is an earned income tax credit. 
This provides an income supplement for those on low income or low earnings. In this 
case the level of the supplement is typically means tested according to family income 
and varies with family size and composition. It is also typically not time-limited and has 
no welfare or UI duration eligibility.  
Both aim to enhance the earnings and labour market attachment of low-income 
individuals. Is one design better than another in achieving this aim? Is one more suited 
to a particular group? To conclude this paper we briefly consider the issues that 
surround the choice of design for such policies. As we have seen the appropriate design 
will depend on the nature of the target group and a detailed knowledge of their labour 
market attachment both cyclically and secularly. It will require a thorough 
understanding of the labour supply behaviour of each group and the changing demand 
for the type of labour supplied by these target groups.  
One principal issue that comes out of our discussion  is whether to ‘time limit’ 
the programme. Most ALMPs are time limited but the large majority of earned income 
tax credit schemes are not.
23 For example, the British New Deal is limited to a fixed 
time period while receipt of the WFTC is not. This aspect of  the programme design 
affects the incentives for self-sufficiency as well as the incentives for wage progression. 
For example, a time limited programme may attenuate the negative disincentives for 
human capital accumulation and in fact may reinforce such incentives.
24 However, as 
the time limit becomes exhausted it may place individual’s back on low earnings or lead 
                                                                                                                                               
part of the WFTC program was to expand significantly it could further encourage labour supply among 
those low income parents currently who are currently out of work and claiming Income Support. 
23 The Canadian SSP is an example of an earned income tax credit that is time limited (see Card and 
Robins, 1998).  
24 See Cossa, Heckman and Lochner (1999).   23
them to return on to welfare.
25 On the other hand an indefinite means tested/tax credit 
programme generates the incentive to reduce human capital accumulation and may thus 
create a culture of dependency on the programme. 
The programmes we have discussed here have relatively complicated 
implications for human capital investment incentives. An earned income tax credit 
programme is likely to reduce the incentives for such accumulation since it provides a 
downward insurance on earnings. On the other hand the success of the programme 
depends partly on the ability of individuals to improve their earnings and hence escape 
low pay.   This depends on the extent of passive learning by doing versus active on the 
job learning. There is little direct evidence on this. However, from other work (Gladden 
and Taber (2000), Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), Dustmann and Meghir (2001), for 
example) we know that wage progression for low skill workers is low, making I very 
unlikely for people to escape low pay and hence exit a programme such as WFTC 
through wage progression due to enhanced experience. 
A possible solution to this would be to encourage training. For example, this 
occurs in the New Deal programme. The question is whether training subsidies for 
private sector training would enhance wage growth for individuals on programmes such 
as WFTC. There is very little experience on this. However it seems that private sector 
training can be quite effective.
26 The problem is that this conclusion may not carry over 
to those who are not selected for treatment in the absence of a subsidy. Generally 
Government sector programmes do not work well.
27 
Earned income tax credits, like the W FTC, are targeted via a means test. 
Typically ALMPs are not means tested but targeted to the low skilled. Means testing 
generates implicit tax rates. The result of which is to create work disincentives for some 
individuals (while by the design of WFTC) to improve incentives for others. Obviously 
the lack of a time limit has to go hand in hand with some eligibility criteria to reduce the 
potential caseload. The precise way that these aspects are designed is crucial for the 
eventual success of a policy.
 28 The advantage of means testing is of course that the one 
                                                 
25 Grogger and Michalopoulos (1999) and Grogger (2000) review the recent evidence. 
26 See Blundell, Dearden and  Meghir (1996) 
27 See Martin (1998), for a review. 
28 Blundell (2001b), investigates the aspects of this trade off in more detail.   24
can target the programme better; however, the resulting distortions should not be 
ignored.
 29 
In summary, it seems that time limits and targeting have their place in the design 
of programmes to enhance labour market attachment and earnings. However, given the 
slow rate of wage progression that can be expected for lower skilled workers, the limit 
must be sufficiently long to ensure reasonable progression and attachment. A better 
understanding of how wage p rogression evolves for low skilled workers would be 
extremely informative in this respect. It also seems that privately provided but 
accredited on the job training can also be an advantage. We have stressed the drawbacks 
of means testing but again it is possible that a combination of means testing and time 
limits can achieve a reasonable balance. However, few programmes with this design 
exist – the Canadian Self Sufficiency Project being an interesting but rare example. Care 
clearly needs to be taken to understand the interactions with other social programmes 
and the tax system, as well as the overall impact on family income and poverty. A 
deeper knowledge of the magnitude of the incentives for wage progression and for 
labour supply and their likely magnitude among the target groups for these policies 
remains an urgent area for empirical research.  
 
                                                 
29 Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) survey the labour market distortions and their likely magnitude.   25
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